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DISCUSSION OF RECENT DECISIONS
ALIENS-DISABILITIES-WHETHER OR NOT REAL ESTATE HELD IN
TRUST FOR BENEFIT OF ALIEN MAY BE FORFEITED BY THE STATE-In the
case of People ex rel. Kunstman v. Shinsaku Nagano,' a private citizen
filed an information in the name of the People of the State of Illinois
seeking to forfeit real estate allegedly held by an alien. The action
was based on the Aliens Act 2 which permits aliens to acquire and
hold real estate by deed, devise or descent, and to transfer, devise or
encumber it, but prohibits the holding of title for more than six
years.8 That statute also provides that unless the land is conveyed
to a bona fide non-alien purchaser for value or the alien is naturalized
within such time, the state's attorney for the county in which the land
is situated must proceed to compel sale. If he neglects to do so for
thirty days after notice and demand, the statute directs that any
citizen may sue in the name of the people, although the proceeds of
sale, after deducting fees and costs, are to go to the state. The in-
1389 Ill. 231, 59 N. E. (2d) 96 (1945).
2 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 6, § 1 et seq.
3 If the alien is an infant at the time of acquisition of the land, he may hold title
for six years after he reaches majority: Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 6, § 2.
330
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formation charged that Nagano, an alien, had purchased Illinois land;
had held it for more than six years without having conveyed to a
bona fide non-alien purchaser for value nor having become natural-
ized; but had, more than six years after acquisition and prior to suit,
conveyed the land to an Illinois banking corporation to hold in trust
for the alien as beneficiary. The trust agreement declared that the
beneficiary's only interest was to be treated as personal property.4
It was also alleged that demand had been made on the state's attorney,
but that official had failed to take action. A motion to dismiss the in-
formation, based on several grounds, was sustained by the lower court
although that court specified no precise reason for such action. The
Illinois Supreme Court, on appeal, affirmed for the reason that Section
2 of the Aliens Act, to the extent that it provided for suit by a private
citizen, was unconstitutional as improperly attempting to authorize
persons not having the responsibility of office to exercise constitu-
tional powers vested in the state's attorney. Left wholly undecided
was the equally important question of whether or not a transfer to a
citizen in trust for the benefit of an alien would prevent forfeiture.
The court's decision, so far as it proceeds, rests upon the acknowl-
edged truth that the sovereign is the ultimate proprietor of all lands
within its boundaries, and it alone possesses the power to regulate
how real estate may be acquired and transferred. 5 Therefore, a pro-
ceeding to divest an alien of real estate involves a public interest and
should be carried out only by a public official,6 for the privilege to
forfeit for alienage is not a prerogative of one but the collective right
of all the citizens of the state. The constitutional representatives of
the state, in proceedings ,by the state affecting a public interest, ought
not be stripped of the inherent functions of their offices by legislative
enactment.
While the court found it unnecessary to decide the real issue of
the case, i. e. whether or not a transfer in trust to a citizen for the
benefit of an alien is a bona fide conveyance to a non-alien purchaser
for Yalue within the definition of the Aliens Act, that problem is one
of grave importance in this state and one on which no authoritative
statement has been made as yet. A solution may, however, be gleaned
by considering the history of land forfeiture because of alienage as
it has been worked out in the decisions of other courts.
4The statute permits the alien to acquire and hold personal property without
limitation: Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 6, § 7.
5 Wunderle v. Wunderle, 144 Ill. 40, 33 N. E. 195, 19 L. R. A. 84 (1893).
6 Fergus v. Russell, 270 Ill. 304, 110 N. E. 130, Ann. Cas. 1916B 1120 (1915);
People ex rel. Courtney v. Ashton, 358 Ill. 146, 192 N. E. 820 (1934) ; Ashton v.
Cook County, 384 Ill. 287, 51 N. E. (2d) 161 (1943).
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At common law, aliens could acquire land by purchase or devise
but not by descent, by act of the parties, but not by operation of law.
7
Such restriction has remained in effect except where changed by
statute,8 and in this state the right of an alien to acquire and hold land
has been modified but slightly.9 The title thus acquired is not divested
except through a judicial proceeding designated "office found," insti-
tuted by the appropriate public official, authoritatively establishing
the fact of alienage. Such proceeding is necessary and vital to pro-
tect the individual from an arbitrary and unreasonable seizure of his
lands by the sovereign. Office found, or its Illinois equivalent, 10
renders the forfeiture a matter of record, allows for notice and hear-
ing, and contemplates that reunion with the public domain will not
take place until judgment is rendered." As a consequence, an alien
who has lawfully acquired and holds land may continue so to hold
against the whole world until office found, and may convey good title
by deed or gift.12
There is no doubt that a state may regulate indirect as well as
direct ownership and control of land within its boundaries by aliens, 13
for the policy of that rule is said to rest upon the ground that it is
7 King v. Boys, 3 Dyer 283 pl. 31, 73 Eng. Rep. 636 (1569) ; Anonymous, 1 Leon.
47, 74 Eng. Rep. 44 (1586) ; King v. Holland, Aleyn 14, 82 Eng. Rep. 889 (1648) ;
Attorney General v. Sands, 2 Freem. Ch. 129, 22 Eng. Rep. 1106 (1670) ; Attorney
General v. Duplessis, Parke 144, 145 Eng. Rep. 739 (1752) ; Fairfax's Devisee v.
Hunter's Lessee, 11 U. S. (7 Cranch) 603, 3 L. Ed. 453 (1813) ; Phillips v. Moore,
100 U. S. 208, 25 L. Ed. 603 (1879). See also 2 Am. Jur., Aliens, § 29; Tiffany,
Real Property, 3d Ed., Vol. 5, § 1377; Washburn, Real Property, 6th Ed., § 131.
8 The right of a state to exclude aliens from acquiring property within its
boundaries to the extent that its safety or policy may direct, except as regulated
by treaty, is not a violation of the equal protection clause of the Federal constitu-
tion. Cockrill v. California, 268 U. S. 258, 45 S. Ct. 490, 69 L. Ed. 944 (1925),
upholding a California statute which forbade aliens, ineligible for citizenship, to
acquire, use, or control agricultural lands and provided for the escheat thereof.
In Toop v. Ulysses Land Co., 237 U. S. 580, 35 S. Ct. 739, 59 L. Ed. 1127 (1915),
a claim that a state statute was repugnant to the Fourteenth Amendment was
characterized as too frivolous to support the taking of jurisdiction by the Federal
Supreme Court.
9 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 6, § 1, permits the acquisition of land by descent. See
also John v. John, 322 Ill. 236, 153 N. E. 363 (1926).
10 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 6, §§ 2-4.
11 Phillips v. Moore, 100 U. S. 208, 25 L. Ed. 603 (1879) ; United States v. De-
Repentigny, 72 U. S. (5 Wall.) 211, 18 L. Ed. 627 (1867) ; Wunderle v. Wunderle,
144 Ill. 40, 33 N. E. 195, 19 L. R. A. 84 (1893).
12 Osterman v. Baldwin, 73 U. S. (6 Wall.) 116, 18 L. Ed. 730 (1867) ; Mott v.
Cline, 200 Cal. 434, 253 P. 718 (1927) ; George v. People, 180 Misc. 635, 40 N. Y. S.
(2d) 830 (1943), affirmed in 267 App. Div. 575, 47 N. Y. S. (2d) 681 (1944) ; State
v. Superior Ct. of Snohomish County, 165 Wash. .648, 5 P. (2d) 1037 (1931); State
v. Kosai, 133 Wash. 442, 234 P. 5 (1925) ; Abrams v. State, 45 Wash. 327, 88 P. 327,
9 L. R. A. (N. S.) 186, 122 Am. St. Rep. 914, 13 Ann. Cas. 527 (1907) ; Dutton v.
Donahue, 44 Wyo. 52, 8 P. (2d) 90, 79 A. L. R. 1355 (1932). See also annotation
to Re Melrose Avenue, 234 N. Y. 48, 136 N. E. 235 (1922), in 23 A. L. R. 1233,
particularly p. 1249, and Washburn, Real Property, 6th Ed., § 131.
13 Frick v. Webb, 263 U. S. 326, 44 S. Ct. 115, 68 L. Ed. 323 (1923), affirming 281
F. 407 (1922). See also cases cited in 3 C. J. S., Aliens, § 12.
DISCUSSION OF RECENT DECISIONS
"unwise to permit the soil of the country to be in the hands of the
subjects of a foreign power, and its revenues to be enjoyed by them;
since the state must be impoverished by transporting the revenues of
the land into foreign countries and weakened by putting a part of its
territory under subjection to a foreign prince." 14  The prohibition
against aliens holding title to land has also been said to depend on
the idea that title should be in the hands of citizens who owe alle-
giance to the government and can be called upon to discharge the
duties of citizenship. 15
The same principle which forbids or limits legal ownership of
lands by an alien extends also to equitable ownership thereof, so that
if the alien may not hold land in his own name, he may not hold land
in the name of a trustee, as that would permit him to accomplish
indirectly what he is forbidden to do directly.16 A trust in real
property for the benefit of an alien is valid, however, where by the
laws of the state he might take and hold title to the real property
itself, at least for a period of time.17
There would seem to be no reason why a use or trust in real
estate for the benefit of an alien should not be regarded as valid until
proceedings by the state, for no one has a right to complain in a col-
lateral proceeding if the sovereign does not enforce its prerogative.
Such a trust would not be void as between grantor and grantee,' 8 and
it would seem that the state, by virtue of office found, could not oust
the trustee who is seized in fee of the lands so held in trust for the
alien, although a court of equity might enforce the trust for the
benefit of the government. 19 But equity would never raise a resulting
trust based on a violation of positive law, so if an alien purchased
land and took an absolute conveyance in the name of a citizen without
any agreement or declaration of trust, the law would not raise a trust
in favor of the alien purchaser if he could not himself hold the title
to the land, any more than it would cast title by descent on the alien
14 Hubbard v. Goodwin, 30 Va. (3 Leigh) 492 at 514 (1832).
15 Marx v. McGlynn, 88 N. Y. 357 (1882).
16 Atkins v. Kron, 48 N. C. (5 Ired.) 207 (1848); State v. Morrison, 18 Wash.
664, 52 P. 228 (1898). See also 1 R. C. L., Aliens, § 32, p. 823.
17 In Kalies v. Ewart, 248 Ill. 612, 94 N. E. 105 (1911), the alien was permitted
to become trustee over lands, subject to the limitfitions of the statute. See also
Hayden v. Sugden, 48 Misc. 108, 96 N. Y. S. 681 (1905).
18 Osterman v. Baldwin, 73 U. S. (6 Wall.) 116, 18 L. Ed. 730 (1867) ; Taylor v.
Benham, 46 U. S. (5 How.) 233, 12 L. Ed. 130 (1847) ; Craig v. Leslie, 16 U. S.
(3 Wheat.) 563, 4 L. Ed. 460 (1818); Isaacs v. DeHon, 11 F. (2d) 943 (1926);
Hammekin v. Clayton, Fed. Cas. No. 5996 (1874) ; Vlahos v. Andrews, 362 Ill. 593,
1 N. E. (2d) 59 (1936) ; Ales v. Epstein, 283 Mo. 434, 222 S. W. 1012 (1920);
Koyoko Nishi v. Downing, 21 Cal. App. (2d) 1, G7 P. (2d) 1057 (1937). See also
2 Am. Jur., Aliens, § 55.
19 Attorney General v. Duplessis, Parke 144, 145 Eng. Rep. 739 (1752); Attorney
General v. Sands, 2 Freem. Ch. 129, 22 Eng. Rep. 1106 (1670) ; McCaw v. Galbraith,
7 Rich. Law (S. C.) 74 (1853).
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heir. The result in such a case must either be that the nominal
grantee takes the land discharged of any trust or else that there is
a resulting trust in behalf of the people of the state which they alone
can enforce against the grantee. The former is the view that has been
adopted wherever the question has arisen.20
On the other hand, if the alien, to evade the law, purchases lands
in the name of a trustee upon an express and declared or secret trust
entitling the alien to take and receive the rents and profits, such a
trust, upon established principles of equity, will pass to the state to
be enforced at its instance and in its favor. 21 To hold otherwise
would be to destroy the very object and purpose of the law and make
it possible, at very little inconvenience and cost, for the alien to cir-
cumvent it. If one is entitled to the rents and profits of land as well
as the sale price, including therein any increase in value, he has the
real substance of ownership and is deprived only of the" privilege of
holding the actual legal title and the attributes of possession and
control. 22 So, too, if a conveyance be fraudulently made by the alien
to prevent forfeiture, such conveyance may be attacked by the state
and set aside just as any other fraudulent conveyance may be at-
tacked.23 However, a conveyance of land to a citizen, in trust to sell
the same and to pay the proceeds to an alien creditor, has been held
valid so that the interest of the alien in the proceeds is not subject
to forfeiture. 24
In the light of these authorities, it would seem clear that had the
court in the instant case decided the problem on the merits rather
than on the limited question of the right and capacity of a private
citizen to sue, it would necessarily have reached an opposite result.
A trust of land for the benefit of an alien who retains the right to the
rents and profits for longer than the statutory period, even though in
the guise of a personal property interest, would seem to be a clear
evasion of the principles prohibiting an alien from holding land and
should warrant a decree of forfeiture.
RUTH MARKMAN
20 In re Tetsubumi Yano's Estate, 188 Cal. 645, 206 P. 995 (1922) ; Ales v. Epstein,
283 Mo. 434, 222 S. W. 1012 (1920) ; Leggett v. Dubois, 5 Paige (N. Y.) 114, 28 Am.
Dec. 413 (1835).
21 Legget v. Dubois, 5 Paige (N. Y.) 114, 28 Am. Dec. 413 (1835); Anstice v.
Brown, 6 Paige (N. Y.) 448 (1837); Hubbard v. Goodwin, 30 Va. (3 Leigh) 492
(1832) ; McCaw v. Galbraith, 7 Rich. Law (S. C.) 74 (1853) ; Dutton v. Donahue,
44 Wyo. 52, 8 P. (2d) 90, 79 A. L. R. 1355 (1932).
22 State v. O'Connell, 121 Wash. 542, 209 P. 865 (1922).
2s Louisville School Board v. King, 127 Ky. 824, 107 S. W. 247, 15 L. R. A. (N. S.)
379 (1908) ; State v. Kusumi, 136 Wash. 432, 240 P. 556 (1925) ; Abrams v. State,
45 Wash. 327, 88 P. 327, 9 L. R. A. (N. S.) 186, 122 Am. St. Rep. 914, 13 Ann. Cas.
527 (1907).
24 Anstice v. Brown, 6 Paige (N. Y.) 448 (1837).
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DEEDS-CONSTRUCTION AND OPERATION-WHETHER OR NOT CONVEY-
ANCE BY HOLDER OF TITLE, JOINED IN BY SPOUSE, TO UN-NAMED GRANTEE
DESIGNATED AS "SURVIVOR" OPERATES TO PASS TITLE TO SPOUSE-In Pure
Oil Company v. Bayler,1 the Illinois Supreme Court had occasion to
pass upon the validity of a deed to certain land owned in fee simple
by one Henry Gray in which deed the grantor and his wife purported
to convey the premises to themselves not by name but by the words
"to the survivor in Fee Simple forever survivor to dispose of [as]
they shall see fit to do." The husband-grantor predeceased his wife.
After the death of both parties, neither leaving children surviving, a
dispute arose between the respective heirs of the husband and wife
with reference to the effect of the deed. The Illinois Supreme Court,
affirming a decision of the trial court, held that the title to the real
estate in question vested in the wife upon delivery of the deed subject,
however, to a condition of defeasance if she should predecease her
husband. Upon a finding that she had survived him, it was declared
that title vested in her heirs.
Three major contentions were advanced by the heirs of the hus-
band to establish their claim to an interest in the land, namely: (1)
that the deed was void because of uncertainty; (2) if not void, that it
conveyed only an undivided one-half interest to the wife as a tenant
in common because it was an unsuccessful attempt to create a joint
tenancy; and (3) that it was an attempted testamentary disposition of
the property without meeting the formal requirements of the statute
applicable thereto. Disposition of the second and third contentions was
deemed to be a matter of comparative ease. There was said to be no
attempt to create an estate in joint tenancy for the reason that all of
the land in question was conveyed. In cases where it has been held
that a conveyance by one person to himself and another as joint
tenants operates to convey only an undivided one-half interest to the
other as tenant in common, it was manifest that the grantor intended
to retain an equal share for himself, with the result that the four
unities of time, title, interest and possession, essentials of a joint
estate, were lacking. 2 It could not be successfully contended that
the deed was an attempted last will and testament for cases of that
character are based on lack of legal delivery.3 Delivery of the deed
here in question was not challenged.
The most perplexing problem which the court had to solve in
reaching its decision was whether or not the identity of the grantee
was made certain. It is well established that to be effective, a deed
must designate as grantee an existing person in whom title can and
1388 Ill. 331, 58 N. E. (2d) 26 (1944).
2 Deslauriers v. Senesac, 331 Ill. 437, 163 N. E. 327 (1928) ; Porter v. Porter, 381
111. 322, 45 N. E. (2d) 635 (1943).
3 Elliott v. Murray, 225 Ill. 107, 80 N. E. 77 (1906) ; Benner v. Bailey, 234 Ill.
79, 84 N. E. 638 (1908).
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does immediately vest.4 In holding that the unnamed "survivor" was
such a grantee, the court found it necessary to ascertain and follow
the real intention of the parties as gathered from the entire instru-
ment and the surrounding circumstances.5 The deed was inartificially
drawn upon a printed blank, the spaces of which had undoubtedly
been filled out by the grantor. The word "survivor," as used in this
deed, obviously was intended to refer back to the only parties named
therein, to-wit: the grantors. Inasmuch as a person cannot convey
to himself that which he already owns,6 the deed operated to convey
nothing to the husband. But the inclusion of a grantee who cannot
take title does not vitiate a deed if there is another grantee capable
of taking,7 so it followed that there was an effective conveyance to
the wife. Designation of a grantee need not be by name if he or she
is described with sufficient certainty to distinguish him or her from
all other persons.8
There does not appear to be any other case, either in Illinois or
elsewhere, involving a parallel set of facts. The designation of the
grantee in the deed in question is not analogous to that found in deeds
where, for example, the attempted conveyance was to "the members"
of a named church, 9 or to "the inhabitants" of two named districts,10
or to "each and every attorney at law in Iowa."" Such deeds have
rightly been held void as being too indefinite for they tend to violate
the policy of the law not to allow title to realty to be permanently
tied up. In the deed here involved, on the other hand, there were
only two persons named, and one of those was incapable of conveying
to himself. It seems logical, therefore, that the court should have
held that there was a valid conveyance to the grantee who could take
title.
P. E. MONTGOMERY
4 Duffield v. Duffield, 268 Ill. 29, 108 N. E. 673 (1915) ; Legout v. Price, 318 Ill.
425, 149 N. E. 427 (1925); Albers v. Donovan, 371 Ill. 45S, 21 N. E. (2d) 563
(1939) ; Herrick v. Lain, 375 Il. 569, 32 N. E. (2d) 154 (1941) ; Chance v. Kimbrell,
376 Ill. 615, 35 N. E. (2d) 48 (1941).
5 Texas Co. v. O'Meara, 377 11. 144, 36 N. E. (2d) 256 (1941) ; Porter v. Porter,
381 Ill. 322, 45 N. E. (2d) 635 (1943) ; Henry v. Metz, 382 Ill. 297, 46 N. E. (2d)
945 (1943) ; Shell Oil Co. v. Moore, 382 Ii1. 556, 48 N. E. (2d) 400 (1943) ; Law v.
Kane, 384 Ill. 591, 52 N. E. (2d) 212 (1944).
6 Deslauriers v. Senesac, 331 Ill. 437, 163 N. E. 327 (1928). See also 18 C. J.,
Deeds, § 36, p. 159; 26 C. J. S., Deeds, § 13, p. 185.
7 See Creighton v. Elgin, 387 I1. 592, 56 N. E. (2d) 825 (1944) noted in 23
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REvIEW 263; Hartwidk v. Heberling, 364 Ill. 523, 4 N. E. (2d)
965 (1936) ; Herrick v. Lain, 375 Ill. 569, 32 N. E. (2d) 154 (1941).
8 16 Am. Jur., Deeds, § 76, p. 482; 18 C. J., Deeds, § 56, p. 174; 26 C. J. S., Deeds,
§ 24, p. 205.
9 Morris v. State, 84 Ala. 457, 4 So. 628 (1888).
10 Hunt v. Tolles, 75 Vt. 48, 52 A. 1042 (1902).
11 State v. McGee, 200 Iowa 329, 204 N. W. 408 (1925).
DISCUSSION OF RECENT DECISIONS
LANDLORD AND TENANT-TERMS FOR YEARS-WHETHER OR NOT TEN-
ANT MAY TERMINATE LEASE BECAUSE OF LIMITATIONS IMPOSED ON USE
OF PREMISES BY WARTIME REGULATIONS-In Crosby v. Baron-Huot Oil
Company,' the Appellate Court for the Second District had occasion
to decide whether the tenant, under a fifteen-year lease made in 1931,
had the right to terminate his lease because of restrictive govern-
mental wartime regulations where a provision in the lease permitted
termination if ". . . the use of the said premises for an oil and gasoline
filling station be prevented, suspended or limited by any zoning
statute, or ordinance, or any other Municipal or Governmental action
or law, or regulation. .. ." The tenant contended that, under this
provision, it was not liable for rent in view of its formal notice to
the lessor of its election to terminate the lease on account of the
rationing of tires, tubes, gasoline and automobiles by the Office of
Price Administration, the restriction on credit sales of these products,
and the limitation on hours of operation imposed by the Petroleum
Administration for War. The trial court held the tenant liable for
rent, interpreting the cancellation clause as applying only to real
estate regulations, i. e. those affecting the use of the particular
property as distinguished from the business conducted thereon. The
Appellate Court, however, took the opposite view, holding that the
intent of the parties, as evidenced by the clause in question, was to
permit cancellation upon governmental restriction of the ordinary
business of operating and maintaining a filling station. It, therefore,
reversed the judgment.
The interpretation of the phrase "use of the said premises,"
when employed in this connection, has been considered by courts in
other jurisdictions with somewhat conflicting albeit not wholly irrec-
oncilable results. Where the phrase was used, as here, in conjunc-
tion with the words "prevented, suspended or limited" the Kentucky
and Minnesota courts interpreted it as covering more than mere real
estate restrictions and as extending to restrictions on the conduct
of the business apart from the real estate.2 On the other hand, when
the phrase was used, in one instance,8 with the words "prevented"
and "restricted" and, in another, 4 with the words "prohibited, limited
or restricted," the New York courts interpreted it as applying merely
to real estate restrictions and as being ineffective to create a right
in the tenant to terminate the lease because of wartime business regu-
lation. The court, in Mid-Continent Petroleum Corporation v.
1324 Ill. App. 651, 59 N. E. (2d) 520 (1945).
2 Mid-Continent Petroleum Corp. v. Barrett, 297 Ky. 709, 181 S. W. (2d) 60
(1944) ; Orme v. Atlas Gas & Oil Co., 217 Minn. 27, 13 N. W. (2d) 757 (1944).
3 Robitzek Investing Co. v. Colonial Beacon Oil Co,, 40 N. Y. S. (2d) 819, 265
App. Div. 749 (1943), leave to appeal denied 291 N. Y. 830, 50 N. E. (2d) 555.
4 First Nat. Bank of New Rochelle v. Fairchester Oil Co., Inc., 45 N. Y. S. (2d)
532, 267 App. Div. 281 (1943), affirmed in 292 N. Y. 694, 56 N. E. (2d) 111 (1944),
cert. den. 323 U. S. -, 65 S. Ct. 69, 89 L. Ed. (adv.) 43 (1944).
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Barrett,5 attempted to distinguish these rulings by pointing out that
the words "prevented" and "restricted" are usually used in speaking
of real property, whereas the words "suspended or limited" have no
such connotation. There is little to distinguish the facts of the four
cases noted, however, other than a slight difference in the words
used in the cancellation clause so, despite the admitted merit of the
attempt to reconcile these divergent opinions, it would appear that
the cases really represent two distinct viewpoints. The Illinois court,
therefore, had some precedent for its holding particularly since the
language used in the two cases similarly decided was virtually iden-
tical with that found in the Illinois lease, while the opposing cases
dealt with leases using slightly different phraseology.
Several cases have been argued during this war wherein the tenant
has sought to have the lease terminated because of governmental
restrictions on the business conducted in the demised premises even
though the lease contained no such option as is found in the instant
case. The majority of these cases involved leases of premises to be
used as filling stations or automobile sales and service stations. The
arguments propounded in support of such attempts have been based
on the "commercial frustration" doctrine or on what amounts to the
same thing, namely: that the -lessee has been deprived of the con-
templated beneficial use of the premises. Prior wars have not given
rise to any such regulation of business as has characterized the
present one. Consequently, while commercial frustration is not a
new doctrine, there has been no direct precedent prior to now for
situations where the frustration arises through governmental regula-
tions of a restrictive but not of a prohibitive nature.
The closest analogy is to be found in the prohibition cases,
although they reflect a situation of absolute interdiction whereas war-
time regulation generally has not wholly stopped but merely limited
certain business activities. Many conflicting decisions concerning
the rights of landlords and tenants under leases for saloon purposes
were promulgated during the period of the Eighteenth Amendment.
Where the lessee expressly reserved the right to terminate the lease
in the event of prohibition, the tenant was, of course, allowed to
cancel.6 Where that right was not reserved, the majority of courts
held that the lessee could terminate the lease anyway, 7 although there
5297 Ky. 709, 181 S. W. (2d) 60 (1944).
rHooper v. Mueller, 158 Mich. 595, 123 N. W. 24 (1909) ; Kahn v. Wilhelm, 118
Ark. 239, 177 S. W. 403 (1915).
7 Levy v. Johnston & Hunt, 224 Ill. App. 300 (1922) ; Greil Bros. Co. v. Mabson,
179 Ala. 444, 60 So. 876 (1912); Kahn v. Wilhelm, 118 Ark. 239, 177 S. W. 403
(1915) ; Christopher v. Charles Blum Co., 78 Fla. 240, 82 So. 765 (1919) ; Schaub
v. Wright, 79 Ind. App. 56,. 130 N. E. 143 (1921) ; Halloran v. Jacob Schmidt
Brewing Co., 137 Minn. 141, 162 N. W. 1082 (1917) ; Kaiser v. Zeigler, 187 N. Y. S.
638, 115 Misc. 281 (1921) ; Heart v. East Tennessee Brewing Co., 121 Tenn. 69,
113 S. W. 364 (1908) ; Brunswick-Balke-Collender Co. v. Seattle Brewing & Malting
Co., 98 Wash. 12, 167 P. 58 (1917).
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was a respectable minority view which held that as the lessee had
failed to foresee this contingency and protect himself against it, he
was bound to pay rent despite the fact that prohibition made impos-
sible the only use permitted by the lease.8 Where the lease permitted
other uses of the premises, although use for the sale of spiritous
liquors was the principal use intended, prohibition did not, according
to the majority rule, operate to relieve the lessee of his obligations. 9
Cases arising out of wartime business regulations have not been
as strong as the saloon cases because, as pointed out before, these
regulations have generally been restrictive rather than prohibitive.
The question of the right of the lessee to terminate because of such
regulations, in the absence of any express provision granting him such
an option, was before an Illinois court in the case of Deibler v.
Bernard Brothers, Incorporated,0 but the court there did not have
to decide that issud for, although the lease described the premises as
an auto showroom and garage, the court found the lessee was not
restricted to such use but could make any other legitimate use of the
premises. Generally, however, the courts have held that the tenant
is not released even though the use of the premises is restricted to
business activities which have been severely curtailed by wartime
regulations. Thus, leases restricting use of the premises to the sale
and service of automobiles," to the sale of automobiles and auto-
mobile accessories, 12 to the sale of gasoline,' 3 to tire and battery sales
and service, 14 to the sale of tires and automobile supplies where actual
operations had been confined to tire sales,' 5 or to gasoline filling sta-
tion purposes' 6 have been held enforcible even though wartime regu-
lations made profitable operation impossible. In all such cases, the
courts uniformly found that the restricted uses of the demised prem-
ises as fixed by the terms of the several leases were still possible to
some degree, so the liability to pay rent remained.
8 Goldrum Tobacco Co. v. Potts-Thompson Liquor Co., 133 Ga. 776, 66 S. E. 1081
(1910) ; Hecht v. Acme Coal Co., 19 Wyo. 18, 113 P. 788 and 117 P. 132 (1911).
9 Christopher v. Charles Blum Co., 78 Fla. 240, 82 So. 765 (1919) ; Home Brew-
ing Co. v. Kaufman, 78 Ind. App. 462, 133 N. E. 842 (1922); Shreveport Ice &
Brewing Co. v. Mandel Bros., 128 La. 314, 54 So. 831 (1911); Standard Brewing
Co. v. Weil, 129 Md. 487, 99 A. 661 (1916). Contra: Doherty v. Monroe Eckstein
Brewing Co., 191 N. Y. S. 59, 198 App. Div. 708, affirming 187 N. Y. S. 633 (1921).
10 385 Ill. 610, 53 N. E. (2d) 450 (1944), affirming 319 Ill. App. 504, 48 N. E. (2d)
422 (1943), noted in 23 CHIcAG0-KENT LAW REvImw 11.
-1 Byrnes v. Balcom, 38 N. Y. S. (2d) 801, 265 App. Div. 268 (1942), affirmed in
290 N. Y. 730, 49 N. E. (2d) 10(4 (1943).
12 Colonial Operating Corp. v. Hannan Sales & Service, Inc., 39 N. Y. S. (2d)
217, 265 App. Div. 411 (1943).
13 Knorr v. Jack & Al, Inc., 38 N. Y. S. (2d) 406, 179 Misc. 603 (1942).
14 Davidson v. Goldstein, 59 Cal. App. (2d) 909, 136 P. (2d) 665 (1943).
15 Mitchell v. Ceazan Tires, Ltd., 25 Cal. (2d) -, 153 P. (2d) 53 (1944).
16 Wood v. Bartolino, 48 N. M. 175, 146 P. (2d) 883 (1944).
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A more restrictive lease was involved in the California case of
Lloyd v. Murphy17 where the tenant held under a lease made for the
"sole purpose of ... the business of displaying and selling new auto-
-mobiles (including the servicing and repairing thereof and of selling
the petroleum products of a major oil company) and for no other
purposes whatsoever without the written consent of the lessor" except
to make "an occasional sale of a used automobile." The tenant was
also denied the right to sublease except with the lessor's consent.
After the government had greatly limited these business activities,
the tenant explained to the lessor the degree to which his business
would be curtailed and the lessor offered to reduce the rent, to waive
the lease provisions with respect to the limitations on use, and to
allow the tenant to sublet the property if he chose to do so. The
tenant, nevertheless, vacated and gave notice that he considered the
lease terminated. When deciding against the tenant, the court said
that, for the tenant to be relieved on the ground ol commercial frustra-
tion, he must prove "that the risk of the frustrating event was not
reasonably foreseeable and that the value of counterperformance is
totally or nearly totally destroyed. ... 18i The mere fact that per-
formance had become unprofitable, more difficult, or more expensive
did not excuse the tenant, particularly since the National Defense
Act19 had been in effect for more than a year prior to the time when
the lease was executed, thereby giving notice that restrictions of
the sort complained of might come into existence at any time during
the term.
Of doubtful authority, in view of the foregoing more recent
decision of a higher court, is the decision of an intermediate Cali-
fornia court in 20th Century Lites, Inc. v. Goodman,20 holding that
the lessee of neon advertising lights for use outdoors was released
by the dimout regulations. The lessor there sought a ruling that the
lease had merely been suspended and not terminated. It pointed out
that the display was custom-made and suitable only for the particular
lessee, but the court held that the lease had been completely terminated
by the original restriction against outdoor lighting displays and could
not be revived, even though daytime use was possible throughout the
entire period.
Courts have stated that if the governmental wartime regulation
amounts to a complete prohibition of all the uses permitted under
the lease, such regulation would terminate the obligations created
thereby. These statements, however, have been made in opinions
holding that the plaintiff-lessor was not entitled to summary judg-
1 25 Cal. (2d) -, 153 P. (2d) 47 (1944).
1825 Cal. (2d) -- at -, 153 P. (2d) 47 at 50.
19 50 U. S. C. A. § 1152(2).
20 64 Cal. App. (2d) 938, 149 P. (2d) 88 (1944).
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ment for rent and that the lessee should have his day in court to
prove, if he could, "that the primary and principal purpose for which
[he] leased the premises has been destroyed by reason of government
regulations."' 21 These cases do not determine that wartime restriction
of business has in fact accomplished such destruction of the beneficial
use of the premises as to vitiate the tenant's obligation to pay rent.
They, too, therefore provide an uncertain basis for the claim that
governmental regulation necessarily means an end to the tenant's
obligations.
The tenor of the current decisions, then, is to the effect that a
tenant cannot terminate his lease even though the business activities
permitted by the lease have been sharply curtailed by governmental
wartime regulation. Nothing short of virtually complete prohibition
of all business uses allowed by the terms of the lease will suffice to
permit termination on the ground of commercial frustration if there
is no escape clause appearing therein. Where such an escape clause
is employed, care should be taken to assure that the language used
is not susceptible of a more limited interpretation than was intended.
Although the Appellate Court has, in the instant case, interpreted the
language in favor of the tenant, the holding is a close one and a slight
change in the words used might easily have led to an opposite result.
J. F. PARTRIDGE
LIMITATION OF ACTIONS-COMPUTATION OF PERIOD OF LIMITATION-
WHETHER OR NOT PENDENCY OF PROCEEDING IN COURT LACKING JURIS-
DICTION OPERATES TO TOLL STATUTE OF LIMITATIONs-The plaintiff
brought an action in the City Court of Granite City predicated upon
the Federal Employers' Liability ActI and the Federal Safety Appli-
ances Act2 for the loss of his foot while trying to set a brake on a
railway car. The brake was defective. The jury found for the plain-
tiff, but the court returned a judgment non obstante veredicto for the
defendant on the ground that the plaintiff was not working in inter-
state commerce. Upon appeal, in Herb v. Pitcairn,3 the Appellate
Court upheld the plaintiff's contention that the question of interstate
commerce was a fact for the jury to find, and that there was sufficient
evidence to support their findings. It, therefore, under the Civil
Practice Act 4 reversed and reinstated the verdict of the jury. The
defendant appealed to the Illinois Supreme Court on the ground that
the provision of the Practice Act under which the Appellate Court
21 Canrock Realty Corp. v. Vim Electric Co., 37 N. Y. S. (2d) 139 at 141, 179
Misc. 391 at 393 (1942). Of like effect is Shantz v. American Auto Supply Co., 36
N. Y. S. (2d) 747, 178 Misc. 909 (1942).
'45 U. S. C. A. § 51 et seq.
245 U. S. C. A. § 1 et seq.
.3306 Ill. App. 583, 29 N. E. (2d) 543 (1940).
4Ill. Rev. Stat. 1930, Ch. 110, § 192(3)c.
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reversed the judgment and reinstated the verdict was unconstitu-
tional.5 That court pointed out that it had previously held the pro-
vision to be unconstitutional.6 It, therefore, reversed and remanded
with directions to send the case back to the circuit court to entertain
a motion for a new trial, or, if denied, to enter judgment on the origi-
nal verdict.
In the meantime, the Illinois Supreme Court had decided two
cases in which it was held that city courts were limited in their
jurisdiction.7 As the accident took place outside of Granite City,
the court in which the proceeding was originally instituted lacked
jurisdiction, so the plaintiff applied for a change of venue to the
Circuit Court of Madison County.8 Change of venue was granted.
The defendant then contended in the circuit court, among other
things, that more than two years had elapsed between the accident
and the bringing of the action in the circuit court, and, therefore,
the suit was barred.9 The circuit court so held and dismissed the
suit. The plaintiff then appealed directly to the Illinois Supreme
Court because the validity of a statute was involved, 10 contending
that as the suit was commenced in the city court in apt time, even
though such court had no jurisdiction to hand down any valid judg-
ment, the filing of the complaint there was a sufficient commencement
of the suit under the federal statute. The Illinois Supreme Court
ruled against this contention and affirmed the judgment of dismissal.
Plaintiff then applied for certiorari to the United States Supreme
Court, which was granted." At first that court refused to render a
decision until it was made clear whether the judgment of the Illinois
court was based upon state or federal law, 12 but upon certificate by the
Illinois Supreme Court that such judgment was partially based upon
the federal statute, the Supreme Court of the United States decided'
that the starting of a suit in a court which had absolutely no jurisdic-
tion would be a sufficient commencement under the federal statute so
long as there was a state statute calling for a change of venue to a
court that had jurisdiction. '
5 Herb v. Pitcairn, 377 I1. 405, 36 N. E. (2d) 555 (1941).
6 Goodrich v. Sprague, 376 Ill. 80, 32 N. E. (2d) 897 (1941).
7 Mitchell v. L. & N. R. R. Co., 379 Ill. 522, 42 N. E. (2d) 89 (1942) ; Werner v.
I. C. R. R. Co., 379 Ill. 559, 42 N. E. (2d) 82 (1942).
8 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 146, § 36.
9 45 U. S. C. A. § 56, was amended Aug. 11, 1939, making the period three years
instead of two.
10 Herb v. Pitcairn, 384 Ill. 237, 51 N. E. (2d) 277 (1943).
1 Herb v. Pitcairn, 321 U. S. 759, 64 S. Ct. 786, 88 L. Ed. 1058 (1944).
12 Herb v. Pitcairn, 323 U. S. -, 65 S. Ct. 459, 89 L. Ed. (adv.) 481 (1945).
Such practice is not novel though rarely used: International Steel & I. Co. v.
National S. Co., 297 U. S. 657, 65 S. Ct. 619, 80 L. Ed. 961 (1936).
13 Herb v. Pitcairn, 323 U. S. -, 65 S. Ct. 954, 89 L. Ed. (adv.) 931 (1945).
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There are few decisions where the courts did not have the benefit
of any kind of statute when asked to decide exactly the same problem,
and all such cases have reached the same conclusion; i. e., that an
action brought in a court having no jurisdiction does not serve to
toll the statute of limitations.14 Such holdings contemplate that in
order to stop the running of the statute of limitations a suit must be
commenced within the time limit laid down by the statute. As a
decision rendered in a court having no jurisdiction is necessarily null
and void and can be attacked directly or indirectly, it follows that the
whole proceeding is null and void and just as if it had never taken
place. In that light, no action has been commenced; hence, there is
nothing to operate to toll the statute.
Opposite results have been obtained with the help of one par-
ticular type of statute, prevalent in most of the states,1 5 which directs
that where an action is brought and dismissed or nonsuited for any
reason other than on the merits a specified time is given, usually one
year, in which to bring another action, even though the statute of
limitations has run in the meantime. Courts have interpreted such
a statute to be applicable to actions dismissed for want of jurisdiction,
as' where the court in which it was brought lacked jurisdiction to
hear the case, even though the statute of limitations had run, because
the case was dismissed for something other than on its merits. As
a consequence, the plaintiff has been granted the specified time in
which to bring another action in a court of competent jurisdiction. 16
Courts speak of statutes of this type as helping the dismissed suit
to toll the statute of limitations. Whether it tolls the statute or merely
extends the period is a matter of conjecture. Whichever way it is
defined, it still gives the plaintiff an opportunity to remedy his error.
The basic case on this aspect is Coffin v. Cottel. 17  While the-
factual situation there involved was different from subsequent cases,
it was the first time that a statute of the type mentioned was given
such construction. The statute of limitations had run while the case
1:4 Smith v. Cincinnati, H. & C. R. Co, 11 F. 289 (1882) ; Fairclough v. Southern
Pac. Co., 157 N. Y. S. 862 (1916) ; Ball v. Hagy, 22 Tex. Civ. App. 318, 54 S. W.
915 (1899). See also Pecos & N. T. Ry. Co. v. Rayzor, 106 Tex. 544, 172 S. W.
1103 (1915); Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Gordon, 218 S. W. (Tex. Civ. App.) 74(1919).
15 Illinois has such a statute. See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943,' Ch. 83, § 24a.
16 Smith v. McNeal, 109 U. S. 426, 3 S. Ct. 319, 27 L. Ed. 986 (1883) ; Gilmore v.
Gilmore, 270 F. 260 (1921) ; Little Rock, M. R. & T. Ry. Co. v. Manees, 49 Ark.
248, 4 S. W. 778, 4 Am. St. Rep. 45 (1887) ; Rifner v. Lindholm, 132 Kans. 434, 295
P. 670 (1931); Hawkins v. Scottish Union & National Ins. Co., 110 Miss. 23, 69
S. 710 (1915); Wente v. Shaver, 350 Mo. 1143, 169 S. W. (2d) 947 (1943) ; Gaines
v. City of New York, 215 N. Y. 533, 109 N. E. 594, L. R. A. 1917C 203, Ann. Cas.
1916A 259 (1915) ; Meshek v. Cordes, 164 Okla. 40, 22 P. (2d) 921 (1933) ; Stevens
v. Dill, 142 Okla. 138, 285 P. 845 (1930) ; Davis v. Parks, 151 Tenn. 321, 270 S. W.
444 (1924); Tompkins v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co., 53 W. Va. 479, 44 S. E. 439,
62 L. R. A. 489, 97 Am. St. Rep. 1006 (1903).
1734 Mass. (16 Pick.) 383 (1832).
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was pending in the probate court. The decision rendered by the
judge, on appeal, was declared null and void because the judge was
related to the plaintiff. The plaintiff was nevertheless allowed to
bring another action under the saving clause before a court having
the right to hear the case. The same principle was reiterated in
Woods v. Houghton.1 8 The theory behind these two cases has been
followed in all subsequent decisions. The reasoning therein follows
equitable lines. As the primary purpose of the statute of limitations
is to compel a creditor to enforce his rights within a reasonable time
or lose his remedy, it does seem unjust to say that a creditor who
has tried to enforce his rights within the allotted time but has made
an error in choosing the proper forum should lose his right. The
jurisdiction of courts is not always well defined, and the question
as to how much jurisdiction a particular court possesses may be
debatable. To penalize a person so heavily for a mistake of this
nature where the error was made in good faith is far too harsh. Where
the plaintiff, in bad faith, attempts to confer jurisdiction upon a
court by falsely alleging the existence of other claims in order to
reach the jurisdictional minimum required, however, it has been held
that he should be denied the benefit of the saving clause 19 as has also
been the case where gross negligence was present.20
The rule above indicated has been applied in law courts but
has also been utilized in equity and federal courts. The saving clause
has been given similar construction, for example, where a suit was
brought in equity and dismissed for want of jurisdiction because
there was an adequate remedy at law;21 where one federal action was
dismissed for want of jurisdiction, but was shifted to another federal
court having competent jurisdiction;22 or where the action was first
brought in a federal court having no jurisdiction and, after dismissal,
was brought in a state court. 23  Only two cases seer to reject this
view, and they have been subjected to criticism. 24
is67 Mass. (1 Gray) 580 (1854).
19 Harden v. Cass County, 42 F. 652 (1890).
20 Warner v. Citizens' Nat. Bank, 267 F. 661 (1920).
21 McKinney v. Springer, 3 Ind. 59, 54 Am. Dec. 470 (1851) ; Burns v. People's
Telephone & Telegraph Co., 161 Tenn. 382. 33 S. W. (2d) 76 (1930) ; Swift & Co.
v. Memphis Cold Storage Warehouse Co., 128 Tenn. 82, 158 S. W. 480 (1913);
Hevener v. Hannah, 59 W. Va. 476, 53 S. E. 635 (1906).
22 Sachs v. Ohio Nat. Life Ins. Co., 131 F. (2d) 134 (1942). The court construed
a like Illinois statute to be applicable to cases where there is a dismissal for want
of jurisdiction.
23 Park & Pollard Co. v. Industrial Fire Ins. Co., 189 N. Y. S. 866 (1921);
Pittsburgh C. C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Bemis, 6" Ohio St. 26, 59 N. E. 745 (1901);
Edmison v. Crutsinger, 165 Okla. 252, 25 P. (2d) 1103 (1933). Contra: United
States v. Boomer, 183 F. 726 (1910).
24 Solomon v. Bennett, 62 App. Div. 56, 70 N. Y. S. 856 (1901) criticised in Davis
v. Parks, 151 Tenn. 321, 270 S. W. 444 (1924) ; Sweet v. Chattanooga Electric Light
Co., 97 Tenn. 252, 36 S. W. 1090 (1896) criticised in Burns v. People's Telephone &
Telegraph Co., 161 Tenn. 382, 33 S. W. (2d) 76 (1930).
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Justification for the holding in the instant case might also be
found, in some states, on the basis of another type of statute, to wit:
one dealing with change of venue from one court to another. Statutes
of this nature vary widely in their language and operation. Only
two such statutes appear to comprehend the immediate problem here
concerned. Kentucky, for example, provides that when an action is
commenced in due time and in good faith in any court, and it is
subsequently adjudicated that such court has no jurisdiction, then
the plaintiff may, within three months, commence a new action in
the proper court. It is expressly declared that "the time between
the commencement of the first and last actions shall not be counted
in applying any statute of limitations. ' 25 A statute in Texas contains
a substantially similar provision provided there has been no "inten-
tional disregard of jurisdiction. ' ' 26 Under these statutes, the present
question would seem amply settled by express language.
27
Another comparable set of statutes is illustrated by California,
where, upon finding of lack of jurisdiction, the court in which the
case was instituted is empowered to transfer the same to the proper
court wherein the matter is to be treated as if the same had "been
commenced at the time the complaint or petition was filed in the
court from which it was originally transferred. ' 28 The pertinent
Illinois statute would seem to fit in this category except for the fact
that it is silent as to when the action in the court to which it is
transferred shall be deemed to have been commenced. 29 The absence
of the phrase "as if there originally instituted" leaves the statute
open to the construction adopted by the Illinois court in the instant
case that the suit cannot be regarded as commenced in the court to
which it is transferred until the time such transfer takes place.
Addition of that simple phrase to the Illinois statute would seem to
be highly desirable in order to reach an obviously just though dif-
ferent interpretation.
Still another group of statutes provide that if objection to juris-
diction is presented, the court in which the case was instituted shall
transfer the same to the proper court but, upon transfer, the case
shall proceed as if it had been there originally instituted. 0  Pre-
25 Ky. Rev. Stat. 1944, Ch. 413 § 413-270.
26 Vernon's Tex. Stat. Anno. 1925, Tit. 91, Art. 5, § 39A.
27 Analogous statutes may be found In Vt. and W. Va.: Vt. Pub. Laws 1933, Tit.
9, Ch. 72, § 1665; W. Va. Code Anno. 1943, § 3410.
2sDeering's Calif. Code of Civ. Procedure and Probate 1941, Tit. 4, § 396. See
also Thompson's Laws of New York 1939, Vol. II, § 110 of the Civ. Prac. Act; Wis.
Stat. 1943, Ch. 269, § 269.51 (2).
29 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 146, § 36, merely provides that, upon transfer, the
cause "shall be then pending and triable.., as In other cases of change of venue."
30 Conn. Gen. Stat. 1930, Tit. 58, Ch. 288, § 5485; Mass. Laws Anno. 1933, Vol. VII,
Ch. 223, § 15; Utah Code Anno. 1943, Vol. VI, Tit. 104, § 104-4-9.
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sumably, in these states, a failure to raise the question of lack of
jurisdiction will operate as a waiver of that question, although the
statute does not purport to authorize the court to proceed even in
the absence of objection.
Confusion may be generated, however, in connection with statutes
found in still other jurisdictions if attention is not given to a funda-
mental distinction between jurisdiction to pass upon the subject
matter and jurisdiction viewed simply from the standpoint of venue.
It has been said that jurisdiction in the former sense can ne.er be
conferred by agreement of the parties,3 1 hence a failure to object that
jurisdiction is lacking could not be regarded as a waiver of that fact.
If the court has power to determine the subject matter but, for rea-
sons of convenience, it is denied the right to hear because of lack
of venue, the parties well might, in disregard of their own conven-
ience, permit the court where the cause was instituted to proceed
with the case and thereby be barred from raising the fundamental
question including the problem here presented. For that reason it
would seem that statutes such as exist in most of the other states
fall wide of the mark, 2 and little reliance can be placed thereon to
settle the instant problem.
It can be seen, then, that some but too little consideration has
been given to provide adequate relief for the unfortunate litigant who,
through error, institutes his proceeding in the wrong court and does
not learn of his mistake until it is too late to transfer or recommence
his suit in a proper court. Although the United States Supreme
Court suggests a possible form of relief, it would seem that the
adoption of adequate legislation on the subject would be more
desirable.
W. HEINDL
MARRIAGE-ANNULMENT-WHETHER ARREST, OR THREAT OF ARREST,
ON SEDUCTION OR BASTARDY CHARGE WILL CONSTITUTE SUFFICIENT DURESS
TO SUPPORT PROCEEDINGS TO ANNUL A MARRIAGE-The recent case of
Smith v. Saum1 involved a plaintiff eighteen years of age in the service
of the United States Navy who charged that he had been arrested on
the complaint of the defendant, nineteen years of age, accusing him
31 Werner v. I. C. R. R. Co., 379 Ill. 559, 42 N. E. (2d) 82 (1942).
32 Arizona Code Anno. 1939, Vol. II, Ch. 21, § 21-102, indicates that if the action
is brought in the wrong county, i. e. venue is lacking, still the court "may continue
the hearing unless the defendant objects" and wants the action transferred. See
also Iowa Code 1939, Tit. 31, Ch. 488, § 11053; Idaho Code Anno. 1932, Vol. I, Tit. 5,
§ 406-407; Minn. Stat. 1941, Vol. II Ch. 542, § 542-10; Mont. Code Anno. 1935,
(Anderson & McFarland), Vol. IV, Ch. 30, § 9097-8; N. C. Gen Stat. 194-3, Ch. I,
§ 1-83; N. D. Rev. Code 1943, Vol. III, Ch. 28-04, § 28-0407; Oregon Comp. Laws
Anno. 1940, Vol. I, Tit. I, § 1-404; S. C. Code 1942, Vol. I, Tit. 6, § 426; S. D. Code
1939, Vol. II, Tit. 33, § 33.0306.
1324 Ill. App. 299, 58 N. E. (2d) 248 (1944).
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of being the father of her unborn child. After arrest, plaintiff was
surrendered by the civil authorities to the Navy's Shore Patrol; was
imprisoned overnight; was not permitted to consult friends or coun-
sel; but, on the following morning was brought into court where a
Naval Petty Officer, without previous notice to plaintiff and in spite
of his statement that he was not and could not be the father of the
child, told the court that plaintiff, defendant therein, was willing to
marry the complaining witness if the proceedings were dismissed.
The quasi-criminal proceedings 2 were dismissed and plaintiff and
defendant, accompanied by their parents and guardians and a civilian
police officer, obtained a marriage license and had a marriage cere-
mony performed. The marriage was never consummated. Plaintiff's
complaint, after alleging these facts, charged that he was immature
and unexperienced, went through the ceremony against his will in the
belief that the Naval Petty Officer had authority to compel him to do
so and that, immediately after the ceremony, he sought to have the
marriage set aside. Defendant, moved to dismiss the complaint for
want of equity, which motion was sustained by the trial court. Plain-
tiff elected to stand by his complaint and his suit was dismissed.
On appeal, the Appellate Court for the First District affirmed that
decision on the ground that a marriage could not be annulled for
duress where the party seeking the decree married to escape prosecu-
tion, provided the charge was not made maliciously or without proba-
ble cause.
Although the question presented by these facts is one of first
impression in Illinois, it has been presented and decided with similar
results in many other jurisdictions. 3 The case possesses additional
interest, however, because of the likelihood that wartime conditions
will possibly bring similar problems before the courts in the immedi-
ate future. That the facts show actual duress can scarcely be denied
2 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 17, authorizes a bastardy proceeding which, though
designated as a quasi-criminal action, has more of the characteristics of a civil
action than a criminal one. Section 15 of the statute also provides that if the
parties marry after the child is born, the child shall be deemed legitimate.
Newman v. Sigler, 220 Ala. 426, 125 So. 666 (1930) ; Kibler v. Kibler, 180 Ark.
1152, 24 S. W. (2d) 867 (1930); Griffin v. Griffin, 130 Ga. 527, 61 S. E. 16, 16
L. R. A. (N. S.) 937, 14 Ann. Cas. 866 (1908'); Sherman v. Sherman, 174 Iowa
145, 156 N. W. 301 (1916) ; Shepherd v. Shepherd, 174 Ky. 615, 192 S. W. 658 (1917) ;
Pray v. Pray, 128 La. 1037, 55 So. 666 (1911) ; Wimbrough v. Wimbrough, 125 Md.
619, 94 A. 168, Ann. Cas. 1916E 920 (1915) ; Day v. Day, 236 Mass. 362, 128 N. E.
411 (1920) ; Zeigler v. Zeigler, 174 Miss. 302, 164 So. 768 (1935) ; Blankenmeister
v. Blankenmeister, 106 Mo. App. 390, 80 S. W. 706 (1904) ; Willits v. Willits, 76
Neb. 228, 107 N. W. 379, 5 L. R. A. (N. S.) 767, 14 Ann. Cas. 883 (1906) ; Ingle v.
Ingle, 38 A. (N. J. Ch.) 953 (1897) ; Scott v. Shufeldt, 5 Paige (N. Y.) 43 (1835) ;
State v. Davis, 79 N. C. 603 (1878) ; State v. English, 101 S. C. 304, 85 S. E. 721,
L. R. A. 1915F 979 (1915) ; Garcia v. Garcia, 144 S. W. (2d) (Tex. Civ. App.) 605
(194,0) ; Harrison v. Harrison, 110 Vt. 254, 4 A. (2d) 348 (1939) ; Thorne v. Farrar,
57 Wash. 441, 107 P. 347, 27 L. R. A. (N. S.) 385, 135 Am. St. Rep. 995 (1910). See
also Robert C. Brown, "Duress and Fraud as Grounds for the Annulment of
Marriage," 10 Ind. L. J. 473 (1935).
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but, in finding the same did not amount to legal duress sufficient to
warrant annulling the marriage, the court was basing its decision on
principles of public policy. To permit one to marry a person he has
wronged, thereby escaping prosecution for his illegal acts, and then
to allow him to annul the very marriage by which he secured such
relief, would be tantamount to eliminating the right to prosecute for
the original offense against public policy and good morals. 4 The state
has a direct interest in securing the future support of the issue of
such an illegal union and would prefer to insure its legitimation,
whereas annulment would strike at both objectives. As a consequence,
it has been held that a marriage consented to because of some sense
of duty and a desire to right a moral wrong will be upheld even
though there is some evidence of duress.5
In much the same manner, if the plaintiff can be presumed to
have elected to go through with the marriage instead of contesting
the criminal charge, such an election may not be rescinded after the
ceremony even though he was not guilty of the alleged offense.6 In
the early New York case of Scott v. Shufeldt,7 for example, annulment
was denied, insofar as the proceedings were based on a claim of
duress, where the man arrested had married the complaining witness
to escape prosecution even though he discovered that the child, born
a few days before his arrest, was a mulatto whereas both he and the
woman were wholly of white blood. If the criminal complaint is
brought maliciously or without probable cause, the election to marry
rather than defend the charge may be rescinded and the marriage
annulled. Such holdings, though, usually rest on the claim of fraud
rather than of duress, and in most of such cases the party seeking
the annulment appears to have been young and naive.8
A mere mistaken belief as to the nature of the penalty, on the
other hand, is not sufficient grounds for'annulment,9 nor is the fact
that the arrest was illegal or without possibility of conviction.1 0
Cohabitation after the ceremony when coercion has ceased to exist
will, of course, destroy any right that might have originally existed
4 Sherman v. Sherman, 174 Iowa 145, 156 N. W. 301 (1916).
5 Collins v. Ryan, 49 La. Ann. 1710, 22 So. 920, 43 L. R. A. 814 (1897) ; Meredith
v. Meredith, 79 Mo. App. 636 (1899) ; Shepherd v. Shepherd, 174 Ky. 615, 192 S. W.
658 (1917) ; Kelley v. Kelley, 206 Ala. 334, 89 So. 508 (1921).
6 Day v. Day, 236 Mass. 362, 128 N. E. 411 (1920).
7 Scott v. Shufeldt, 5 Paige (N. Y.) 43 (1835).
8 Short v. Short, 265 Ill. App. 133 (1932) ; Smith v. Smith, 51 Mich. 607, 17 N. W.
76 (1883) ; Ingle v. Ingle, 38 A. (N. J. Ch.) 953 (1897) ; Shoro v. Shoro, 60 Vt.
268, 14 A. 177, 6 Am. St. Rep. 118 (1888).
9 Rogers v. Rogers, 151 Miss. 644, 118 So. 619 (1928) ; Ingle v. Ingle, 38 A. (N. J.
Ch.) 953 (1897).
10 Marvin v. Marvin, 52 Ark. 425, 12 S. W. 875, 20 Am. St. Rep. 191 .(1890);
Ingle v. Ingle, 38 A. (N. J. Ch.) 953 (1897); Scott v. Shufeldt, 5 Paige (N. Y.)
43 (1835).
DISCUSSION OF RECENT DECISIONS
to have the marriage annulled," unless the party coerced was im-
mature.
12
A nice question is presented where actual and legal duress is
present but the coercion is brought to bear by third persons. The
majority rule seems to be that'the defendant must have participated
in the coercion or knowingly have taken advantage of it in order for
the victim of the duress to succeed in his annulment suit,' 3 although
at least one court has held that participation in the duress will be
irrebuttably presumed where the duress was brought to bear by rela-
tives or close friends. 14 A minority view, followed in Illinois, regards
this as unnecessary, 15 so that the acts of public officials or others, if
constituting legal duress, would be sufficient to support annulment
even though not sanctioned or ratified. The significant feature of the
instant case, therefore, lies in the fact that plaintiff accepted the
election proposed rather than in any question as to the sufficiency
of the duress imposed.
While the result of the instant case would probably not have
been reached if only a simple contract were involved, still, when
public policy and social conventions are considered, the justification
for the holding becomes more nearly apparent.
J. F. PARTRIDGE
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS- POLICE POWER AND REGULATIONS-
WHETHER OR NOT PROVISION IN ZONING ORDINANCE RESTRICTING EXTEN-
SION OF NONCONFORMING USES Is ARBITRARY AND UNREASONABLE-In
Mercer Lumber Companies v. Village of Glencoe,' the plaintiff filed
suit to enjoin the enforcement of a zoning ordinance as applied to
its property and prayed that the same be declared void. Plaintiff's
property had been used as a lumber yard for more than twenty-five
years, which yard was in existence before the original zoning ordi-
nance had been adopted. Such use amounted to a nonconforming use
under the original ordinance and was so treated under the revised
ordinance here concerned which placed the property in three different
zones or classifications, none of which included lumber yards among
permitted uses. The particular provision complained of, however,
stipulated that nonconforming uses in existence at the time the ordi-
11 Thompson v. Thompson, 148 La. 499, 87 So. 250 (1921); Owings v. Owings,
141 Md. 416, 118 A. 858 (1922).
12 Short v. Short, 265 Il1. App. 133 (1932).
13 Shepherd v. Shepherd, 174 Ky. 615, 192 S. W. 658 (1917) ; Fratello v. Fratello,
193 N. Y. S. 865, 118 Misc. 584 (1922); Sherman v. Sherman, 20 N. Y. S. 414(1892) ; Campbell v. Moore, 189 S. C. 497, 1 S. E. (2d) 784 (1939).
14 Marks v. Crume, 16 Ky. L. 707, 29 S. W. 436 (1895).
15 Lee v. Lee, 176 Ark. 636, 3 S. W. (2d) 672 (1928) ; Schwartz v. Schwartz, 29
Ill. App. 516 (1889).
1 390 Iii. 138, 60 N. E. (2d) 913 (1945).
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nance was passed could be continued and even altered but could not
be extended to exceed thirty percent. of the cubic contents of non-
conforming buildings as they existed on the day the original ordi-
nance was adopted2 although change to conforming uses was per-
mitted. Although a master in chancery found in favor of the plaintiff
and recommended that a whole new zoning ordinance be adopted, the
chancellor decreed that the ordinance was valid and reasonable and
dismissed the suit. On appeal taken directly to the Illinois Supreme
Court because the trial court certified that the validity of a municipal
ordinance was in question, such decree was affirmed, thereby deciding
for the first time in this state that reasonable regulation of the ex-
tension of nonconforming uses was permissible under zoning laws.
Attack on the validity of the ordinance involved in the instant
case, as in all cases of its type, was made on the ground that the
same was unnecessary, unreasonable and arbitrary. The reason for
such a regulation can, however, readily be seen. When a municipal
council decides that, in order to keep the growth of the particular
city under control, it is advisable to enact some sort of zoning ordi-
nance and it takes advantage of the enabling act, the council adopts
such regulation as it deems desirable for the particular situation
before it.3 The validity of such comprehensive zoning ordinances
has been upheld innumerable times as a proper exercise of the police
power 4 provided the operation thereof is reasonable and not arbi-
trary.5 It is likely that, before the adoption of such regulation,
different types of property uses have been in existence for some time
and may be spread irregularly throughout the municipality. When a
zoning plan is adopted, such existing uses will probably not conform
to planned restrictions applicable to the particular use district devel-
oped thereby but, under normal conditions, such zoning ordinances do
not operate retroactively hence the nonconforming uses then in ex-
istence must be allowed to remain.6 Exemption thereof from the
zoning scheme is said to rest on the theory that too great a hardship
would be inflicted and unnecessary destruction of property would
2 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 24, § 73-1(8), gives the municipality power to regulate
and prevent additions, alterations, or remodeling of existing buildings.
3 The enabling statute in this state is Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 24, § 73-1, et seq.
4 Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U. S. 365, 47 S. Ct. 114, 71 L. Ed. 303, 54
A. L. R. 1016 (1926) ; Neef v. City of Springfield, 380 Il1. 275, 43 N. E. (2d) 947
(1942). For other cases, see annotation in 117 A. L. R. 1117.
5 Taylor v. Village of Glencoe, 372 Ill. 507, 25 N. E. (2d) 62 (1939) ; Western
Theological Seminary v. City of Evanston, 331 Ill. 257, 162 N. E. 863 (1928). See
also cases cited in 117 A. L. R. 1123.
6 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 24, § 73-1, expressly exempts existing nonconforming
uses. The validity of such provisions is dealt with in City of Aurora v. Burns,
319 Ill. 84, 149 N. E. 784 (1925), and Illinois Life Ins. Co. v. City of Chicago, 244
Ill. App. 185 (1927). Cases involving the absence of specific provision exempting
nonconforming uses are noted in 86 A. L. R. 684.
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result if such nonconforming uses were made to conform 7 whereas
"zoning seeks to stabilize and not to destroy." Municipal councils,
therefore, usually look to the future and to the eventual confinement
of specified uses into districts created for such purpose.9
To that end, it is necessary to see to it that existing uses which
do not conform are not given an opportunity to expand or to become
even more serious nonconforming uses than they originally were, for
new construction "might destroy a residence district where the con-
tinuation of the original building would be comparatively harmless."'10
The perpetual existence of these nonconforming uses violates the
eventual plan of the municipality" but, by regulating them, they can
be kept under control and may, in the end, be eliminated. 12 Such
regulation would seem to be a legitimate exercise of-the police power,
for that power can be used not merely to maintain the status quo but
also to plan for the future. 13 Regulatory provisions of this nature
have been upheld elsewhere if they take the form of (1) forbidding
the owner of the nonconforming use from substituting another non-
conforming use therefor; 14 (2) denying him the right to enlarge or
change the same structurally; 15 (3) forbidding rebuilding if the ex-
isting building or more than half of it is destroyed unless change is
7 James, Metzenbaum, The Law of Zoning (Baker Voorhis & Co., New York,
1930), p. 287.
8 Edward M. Bassett, Zoning (The Russell Sage Foundation, New York, 1926),
p. 105.
9 Thayer v. Board of Appeals of City of Hartford. 114 Conn. 15, 157 A. 273
(1931) ; Town of Darien v. Webb, 115 Conn. 581, 162 A. 690 (1932); Austin v.
Older, 283 Mich. 667, 278 N. W. 727 (1938).
10 Bassett, op. cit., p. 109.
11 Piccolo v. Town of West Haven, 120 Conn. 449, 181 A. 615 (1935); Conway v.
Atlantic City, 107 N. J. L. 404, 154 A. 6 (1931).
12 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 24, § 73-1, contemplates the gradual elimination of non-
conforming uses which existed before the ordinance was passed. Metzenbaum,
op. cit., p. 288, declares: "Within a period of another twenty years, a large num-
ber of such 'non-conforming uses' will have disappeared, either through the neces-
sity of enlargement and expansion which invariably is forbidden by ordinance, or by
the owners realizing that it is unwise and uneconomic to be located in a district
which probably is not suitable for the non-conforming purpose, or by obsolescence,
destruction by fire or by the elements, or similar inability to be used; so that
many of these non-conforming uses will 'fade out,' with a resulting substantial
benefit to all communities."
13 Zahn v. Board of Public Works, 195 Cal. 497, 234 P. 388 (1925), affirmed in
274 U. S. 325, 47 S. Ct. 549, 71 L. Ed. 1074 (1927).
14 Wilson v. Edgar, 64 Cal. App. 654, 222 P. 623 (1923) ; Collins v. Moore, 211
N. Y. S. 437, 125 Misc. 777 (1925).
15 Rehfeld v. City and County of San Francisco, 218 Cal. 83, 21 P. (2d) 419
(1933) ; Selligman v. Von Allman Bros., 297 Ky. 121, 179 S. W. (2d) 207 (1944) ;
State v. City of New, Orleans, 171 La. 1053, 132 So. 786 (1931) ; Austin v. Odler,
283 Mich. 667, 278 N. W. 727 (1938) ; Green v. Board of Com'rs of City of Newark,
131, N. J. L. 336, 36 A. (2d) 610 (1944) ; Meixner v. Board of Adjustment of City
of Newark, 131 N. J. L. 599, 37 A. (2d) 678 (1944) ; Ventres v. Walsh, 201 N. Y. S.
226, 121 Misc. 494 (1923).
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made to a conforming use;16 or (4) directing that where there has
been a discontinuance of the nonconforming use, whether involving
change to a conforming one or not, the property can never again be
used in the nonconforming fashion.17 The instant provision is not
unlike these in character.
It is obvious that as regulations of the types mentioned are but
part and parcel of comprehensive zoning ordinances, they must be
enacted under the same power as the more general ones, to-wit: the
police power. Such power has always been subject to the limitation
that it must be reasonably and not arbitrarily exercised.' 8 The com-
plainant in the instant case contended that the provision involved was
not a proper and legitimate exercise of that power for it depreciated
the value of property in that, by limiting any extension to thirty per
cent. of the existing use, it would prevent the owner from getting
the maximum value out of the same. When determining the relative
reasonableness or unreasonableness of a provision of this kind, the
court may take into consideration the damage done to property
values, 19 but that is but one factor to be recognized and is never
controlling by itself.20 If the courts were to allow that factor alone
to determine the validity of such regulations, reason dictates that no
zoning ordinance could ever be upheld as "every exercise of the police
power is apt to affect adversely the property interests of somebody." 21
Comparing the provision in the instant case with like provisions
under other ordinances which have been declared to be reasonable, the
inevitable conclusion is reached that the instant provision creates no
such extreme hardship as to warrant calling it unreasonable. In fact,
it is far more generous in its provisions than was the case in the fol-
lowing illustrations. In two Louisiana cases, for example, the owners
of nonconforming uses in existence before the ordinance was passed
were forced to liquidate within one year, but such provision was up-
held. 22 Hadachek v. Sebastian23 provides an example of even more
16 State v. Hillman, 110 Conn. 92, 141 A. 294 (1929) ; Koeber v. Bedell, 3 N. Y. S.
(2d) 108, 254 App. Div. 584 (1938).
17 State v. Baumauer, 234 Ala. 286, 174 So. 514 (1937) ; Town of Darien v. Webb,
115 Conn. 581, 162 A. 690 (1932).
18 See cases cited in note 4, ante.
19 Reschke v. Village of Winnetka, 363 Ill. 478, 2 N. E. (2d) 718 (1936) ; Taylor
v. Village of Glencoe, 372 Ill. 507, 25 N. E. (2d) 62 (1939).
20 In Geneva Inv. Co. v. City of St. Louis, 87 F. (2d) 83 at 90 (1937), the court
said: "The loss sustained by appellant through depreciation in value, if the ordi-
nance is sustained, while proper for the consideration of the court, Is not con-
trolling, for if the police power is properly exercised, loss to the individual is a
misfortune which he must undergo as a member of society." To the same effect
are Delano v. City of Tulsa, 26 F. (2d) 640 (192g), and Marblehead Land Co. v.
City of Los Angeles, 47 F. (2d) 528 (1931).
21 Zahn v. Board of Public Works, 195 Cal. 497 at 512, 234 P. 388 at 394 (1925).
22 State v. Jacoby, 168 La. 752, 123 So. 314 (1929) ; State v. McDonald, 168 La.
172, 121 So. 613 (1929), cert. den. 280 U. S. 556, 50 S. Ct. 16, 74 L. Ed. 612 (1929).
23 239 U. S. 394, 36 S. Ct. 143, 60 L. Ed. 348, Ann. Cas. 1917B 927 (1915).
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extreme hardship. There, a brickyard had been operated before the
zoning ordinance was enacted but the owner was forced to abandon
the property, worth approximately $800,000 and which could be used
only as a brickyard because of the clay pits there present, by reason
of the new ordinance. The court said, in substance, that if private
interests stood in the way of community development, they must give
way or else the municipality could not properly expand. In still
another case, that of Cole v. City of Battle Creek,24 no structural
change whatsoever, was permitted even though such change might
decrease the cubical content of the nonconforming use. The court
said any change which would prolong the life of such a use would
violate the spirit of the zoning ordinance and should be prohibited.
Any increase in either the cubic contents or size of existing non-
conforming uses has also been forbidden under other decisions. 25 In
the light of such decisions, the ordinance here concerned was far from
unreasonable.
A further argument was presented on the ground that, in order
to be a proper exercise of the police power, the regulation had to
bear some substantial relation to the health, safety, or general welfare
of the people. 26 It was claimed that the limitation on extension to
thirty percent. was arbitrarily arrived at and that if an extension of
that size would do no harm then one amounting to fifty or sixty
percent. would present no such widespread difference as to create a
condition which would result in an adverse effect. It is clear, though,
that courts will not disturb the judgment of the council and will
treat its findings as conclusive unless there is definite demonstration
that there is no relation between the ordinance and the public safety,
health, or general welfare sought to be subserved thereby. 27 For that
matter, even where there is doubt either way as to the reasonableness
or unreasonableness of the provision, the court will not substitute its
judgment for that of the council. 28 There was a difference of opinion,
in the instant case, between the findings of the chancellor and those
of the master in chancery on the question of the reasonableness of the
provision. The upper court seized upon this as a basis for holding
24 298 Mich. 98, 298 N. W. 466 (1941).
25 City of Lewiston v. Grant, 120 Me. 194, 113 A. 181 (1921) ; DeVito v. Pearsall,
115 N. J. L. 323, 180 A. 202 (1935) ; State v. Stegner, 120 Ohio St. 418, 166 N. E.
226, 64 A. L. R. 916 (1929). See also American Wood Products Co. v. City of
Minneapolis, 21 F. (2d) 440 (1927). Other comparisons are provided by the cases
cited in footnote 15, ante, where the provisions involved were similar to the one
in the instant case.
28 Forbes v. Hubbard, 348 Ill. 166, 180 N. E. 767 (1932); Harmon v. City of
Peoria, 373 I1. 594, 27 N. E. (2d) 525 (1940). See also 117 A. L. R. 1123.
27 Neef v. City of Springfield, 380 Ill. 275, 43 N. E. (2d) 947 (1942) ; Speroni v.
Board of Appeals of City of Sterling, 368 Ill. 568, 15 N. E. (2d) 302 (1938).
-a8Avery v. Village of LaGrange, 381 Ill. 432. 45 N. E. (2d) 647 (1942) ; Burk-
holder v. City of Sterling, 381 Ill. 564, 46 N. E. (2d) 45 (1943).
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that, because of the doubt engendered, it would not overrule the
judgment of the municipal council.
In considering whether or not any relationship exists between a
regulation of this type and the police power, the court should be
careful as to the way in which it approaches the problem. It could
easily find that no such relationship exists, for an extension or change
in a nonconforming use might not immediately or directly affect the
neighbors or the general public in any detrimental fashion at the
particular time. That fact was noted by the California court in
Rehfield v. City and County of San Francisco 29 when it stated: "The
finding that the public welfare would not be in danger is beside the
point. Obviously, a rezoning would not cause injury to the public,
but the whole value of zoning lies in the establishment of more or
less permanent districts, well planned and arranged. If, upon the
complaint of the owner, the courts are to re-examine each instance of
inclusion or exclusion of property from a district, solely with regard
to the dangerous or non-dangerous character of the particular struc-
ture, and irrespective of the general scheme of the ordinance, then
there is, of course, no possibility of ever achieving successful zon-
ing."30  The court should, therefore, take the whole zoning scheme
into consideration along with the immediate problem as it affects the
complainant's property in order to determine whether the extension
or change would be detrimental to the people not alone at present but
also in the future. That reasoning, at least, has been followed in some
cases. In one of them, for example, a dairy was denied a permit to
put up brick walls to take the place of the rotted wooden ones.3 '
Constructing brick walls would not immediately and directly be in-
jurious to the public health, safety, or general welfare but rather
would promote safety. Nevertheless, it was said that by putting up
brick walls the life of the nonconforming use would be prolonged,
thereby defeating the general scheme of zoning, so that the ultimate
good would have to outweigh the immediate benefit.
3 2
The principles involved in zoning problems of this character are
simple and can easily be stated. Everyone holds his property subject
to the reasonable and proper operation of the police power.3 3 The
court, in determining whether that power has been used in a reason-
able and proper manner, must examine the facts involved in each case.
What is reasonable and what is capricious in a given situation is
generally reflected in contemporary thought. As people come more
29 218 Cal. 83, 21 P. (2d) 419 (1933).
3o218 Cal. 83 at 86, 21 P. (2d) 419 at 420.
31 Selligman v. Von Allman Bros., 297 Ky. 121, 179 S. W. (2d) 207 (1944).
32 Refusal to permit extension of a dairy has been sustained on the same
ground: State v. Harper, 182 Wis. 148, 196 N. W. 451 (1923).
33 Zadworny v. City of Chicago, 380 Ill. 470, 44 N. E. (2d) 426 (1942).
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and more to the realization that it is better to segregate industrial
and marketing districts from residential ones, they will regard as
reasonable that which previously might have been deemed arbitrary
restraint. It can be expected, therefore, that even more rigid and
still harsher regulations than those here concerned will be upheld as
being reasonable and proper. The Illinois Supreme Court, at least,
has set its foot in the right direction.
W. HEINDL
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-ACTION AGAINST THIRD PERSONS FOR
EMPLOYEE'S INJURY OR DEATH-WHETHER NOTICE OF REJECTION OF
BENEFITS OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT Is REQUIRED OF AN ILLE-
GALLY EMPLOYED MINOR-In Oran v. Kraft-Phenix Cheese Corporation'
the plaintiff, an illegally employed minor not quite sixteen years of
age, brought suit by next friend to recover for injuries sustained
while making a delivery when crowded against a parked car by the
defendant's truck. The defendant's answer set forth the fact that
the parties concerned were all subject to and operating under the
Workmen's Compensation Act. 2 Plaintiff's reply did not deny such
fact but alleged that, as he was illegally employed, he had a right to
bring his own action at law. Without notice or leave of court,3 de-
fendant filed a further pleading in which it was alleged that plaintiff
had not, within six months of the accident, 4 filed a rejection of his
right to claim benefits under the compensation law. After verdict for
plaintiff at a trial on such issues, the trial court granted the defend-
ant's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. On appeal by
plaintiff, the Appellate Court for the First District reversed such
decision on the ground that the time limitation contained in Section 6
of the Workmen's Compensation Act did not run against a minor
until a legal representative had been appointed for him.
Although that holding had been indicated as probably being the
law of this state,5 the instant case presents the first clear-cut answer
to a query propounded in the columns of the Chicago-Kent Law
1324 Ill. App. 463, 58 N. E. (2d) 731 (1944).
2 Such defense proceeded on the theory that any cause of action was transferred
to the plaintiff's employer: Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 48, § 166.
3 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 110, § 156, contemplates that further pleading after the
reply may be permitted only "as ordered by the court."
4 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 48 § 143, as amended in 1931, states in part: "... Pro-
vided, further, that any illegally employed minor or his legal representatives shall,
except as hereinafter provided, have the right, within six months after the time
of injury or death, to file with the commission a rejection of his right to the bene-
fits under this Act, in which case such illegally employed minor or his legal repre-
sentatives shall have the right to pursue his or their common law or statutory
remedies to recover damages for such injury or death ....
5 Kijowski v. Times Publishing Corp., 298 Ill. App. 236, 18 N. E. (2d) 754 (1939).
Judgment therein was affirmed by the Illinois Supreme Court on other grounds:
372 Ill. 311, 23 N. E. (2d) 703 (1939). The precise question concerned was not
discussed In the Supreme Court opinion.
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Review a short time ago6 and confirms the judgment of that writer to
the effect that the time limitation imposed by Section 6 would not
operate against the minor prior to the appointment of a guardian. 7
To reach that result, the court relied on earlier Illinois cases" indicat-
ing it to be the pronounced public policy of the state to guard the
rights of minors, from which premise it was reasoned that it would
not be safeguarding the rights of minors to construe the statute so
as to require the minor to do that which could not validly be done.
Strict enforcement of Section 6, as written, would work a contradic-
tion by requiring the minor to give notice of rejection within six
months after injury, but at the same time not allowing him to give
such notice except through a duly appointed representative. The
court, therefore, seems to have arrived at the only logical and prac-
tical solution.
Illinois appears to be the only state to enact legislation requiring
an illegally employed minor to file notice of rejection before permit-
ting him to pursue common law remedies and, in view of the decision
in the instant case, it would appear unlikely that similar legislation
would be promulgated in other states. In contrast, many states have
expressly provided that any time limitations specified in their com-
pensation laws are not to apply to or operate against minors until
after a guardian or other legal representative has been appointed to
act in the minor's behalf. 9 While some state statutes stipulate that
a minor, for all purposes, stands in the same relation to the compen-
sation laws as do adults, 10 such statutes reflect a definite minority
view. In the other states, although no specific mention of the point is
made in the state statute, it is likely that the same result as that
0 See Angerstein, "The Child Labor Act and the Workmen's Compensation Act
of Illinois," 20 CHiCAGo:KENT LAW REVIEW 193, particularly p. 202 (1942).
7 Judicial notice of Mr. Angerstein's analysis of the problem was given: 324 Ill.
App. 463 at 476, 58 N. E. (2d) 731 at 736.
s Waechter v. Industrial Commission, 367 Il1. 256, 11 N. E. (2d) 378 (1937);
Wallgreen Co. v. Industrial Commission, 323 Ill. 194, 153 N. E. 831, 48 A. L. R.
1199 (1926); Maskallunas v. Chicago and Western Indiana R. Co., 318 Ill. 342,
149 N. E. 23 (1925); Hasterlik v. Hasterlik, 316 Ill. 72, 146 N. E. 498 (1925);
McDonald v. City of Spring Valley, 285 Ill. 52, 120 N. E. 476, 2 A. L. R. 1359 (1918).
9 Ark. Laws 1939, p. 777, § 18(c); Cal. Deering Code, Labor, Part IV, Ch. 2,
§ 5408; Ida. Code Anno. 1932, Ch. 12, § 43-1206; Ind. Burns Stat. Anno. 1933,
§ 40-1413; Kas. Gen. Stat. 1935, Ch. 44, § 509; Ky. Rev. Stat. 1944, § 342.210; Me.
Rev. Stat. 1930, Ch. 55, § 22; Mo. Rev. Stat. 1939, Vol. I, § 3695a; Mont. Rev. Code
1935, Ch. 256, § 2900; N. J. Rev. Stat. 1937, Vol. II, Ch. 34:15, § 51; N. Y. Baldwin
Cons. Laws 1938, Vol. VII, Work. Comp. Law, Art. 7, § 115; N. Car. Gen. Stat.
1943, Vol. II, Ch. 97, § 50; Okla. Stat. 1941, Tit. 85, § 106; S. Car. Code 1942,
§,7035-52; Tex. Vernon's Civ. Stat. Anno., Art. 8306, § 13; Vt. Pub. Laws 1933,
Tit. 30, § 6540; Va. Code Anno. 1942, Ch. 76A, § 1887(50); Wyo. Rev. Stat. 1931,
Ch. 124, § 108.
10 Ala. Code 1940, Tit. 26, § 296; Ariz. Code Anno. 1939, Ch. 56, § 56-974; Colo.
Stat. Anno. 1935, Ch. 97, § 288(b); Minn. Stat. 1941, Vol. I, Ch. 176, § 18.
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achieved in the instant case would be obtained, particularly when it
is borne in mind that a minor is incompetent to act for himself and,
being presumed to be without knowledge of his legal rights or obli-
gations, is under special protection from the law until a guardian or
other competent person has been chosen to represent him.
R. K. POWERS
